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1 Introduction
According to both the latest IPCC report (2007) and the recently published
Stern report (2006), atmospheric CO2 stabilization targets as low as 450 ppm
could be needed in order to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interferences with
the earths climate system. With reasonable projections of world economic
growth, such stabilization targets among others require more than twice as
much emission-free power by mid-century than we now derive from fossil fuels
(Caldeira et al. 2002).
Clearly, this is a major technological challenge, and many di¤erent pol-
icy tools are being implemented in order to spur the introduction of carbon
free technologies. However, according to among others the Stern report, the
current e¤ort is far to weak. The public debate, at least in the European
Union, also evolves around di¤erent domestic measures going far beyond the
obligations of the Kyoto protocol as how to speed up the rate of carbon free
technology deployment.
The early economic literature on climate change advocated a more gradual
approach to climate change, see for instance the seminal paper by Wigley et al
(1996). Since future costs are discounted and a fraction of the carbon emitted
today are removed from the atmosphere by natural processes as time passes,
we should postpone expensive carbon abatement. On the other hand, in the
early literature technological progress was either disregarded or exogenous,
and critics claimed that if technological change were made endogenous results
would change.
Models with endogenous technological change explains technological progress
either by including investments in knowledge creation or by assuming that pol-
lution abatement today will lead to more e¢ cient abatement in the future,
that is, so-called learning-by-doing. Both approaches are treated in Goulder
and Mathai (2000). Rather surprisingly, they found that technological change
from knowledge creation implied lower carbon taxes both today and in the
future, and consequently, also less carbon abatement today.
On the other hand, when endogenous technological change is modelled as
learning-by-doing, results correspond better with common intuition. Goulder
and Mathai found that learning-by-doing could imply a high tax rate from the
beginning, and similar conclusions are also suggested in other contributions,
see for instance Grübler and Messner (1998) and Rosendahl (2004).
In Romer (1990) Romer criticizes endogenous growth models based on
learning-by-doing. According to Romer these models rely on the assumption
that learning is completely nonexcludable. However, in many instances rms
are able to protect their new discoveries from being copied by other rms.
In this case competition is likely to be imperfect as shown by Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1988), and hence, the simple learning-by-doing set up, applied for
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instance by Goulder and Mathai, is not appropriate.1
In our opinion, some of the criticism of learning-by-doing models also holds
with respect to the knowledge creation approach when applied to climate pol-
icy. For example, in Goulder and Mathai (2000) innovation of new products
and processes is not modelled explicitly, and it is assumed that all market fail-
ures connected to knowledge creation are taken care of by other policies than
climate policy. Moreover, in their model the government directly decides both
the amount of carbon abatement and the rate of knowledge accumulation.
In this paper we look at climate policy with an explicit modelling of the
R&D process. Both the decision to invest in R&D and the decision to abate
are left to the market. In particular, we adapt the endogenous growth model
by Romer (1990) to the issue of carbon abatement. Both the supply and
demand for new carbon abatement innovations is then explicitly modelled,
and the carbon emitting sectors choose to install new innovations in response
to an emission tax.
This also allows us to introduce four sorts of market failures or external-
ities: I) Monopolistic pricing of new innovations, II) A dynamic knowledge
externality that either is a "standing on shoulders" type or a "shing out"
type, III) A crowding externality in R&D, and IV) Insu¢ cient patent pro-
duction, which we refer to as a "learning externality". The latter implies that
patents may be copied by other rms, and that the incentives for innovation
are weakened.
When including decentralized decision making by private agents, numer-
ical simulations indicate that governments should under some circumstances
set a higher carbon tax today if we have technological change driven by R&D
than if we have pure exogenous technological change. These circumstances
are i) "a standing on shoulders" type of externality in R&D and/or ii) weak
patent protection.
We derive our results in a fashion that makes the two scenarios easily
comparable. That is, we rst derive the optimal emission tax path with
endogenous technological change. This yields an innovation path which then
can be treated as exogenous in another round of simulations in order to nd
the optimal tax path without endogenous technological change.
While our focus is on the qualitative implications for climate change pol-
icy of endogenous technological change, other studies analyze how endogenous
technological change is likely to inuence the costs of implementing tough cli-
mate targets, see for example Buonanno et al. (2003), Goulder and Schnieder
(1999) and Gerlagh and Lise (2005). Most of the studies seems to agree that
ignoring the existence of endogenous technological change leads to overesti-
mation of the costs of achieving various climate targets, although Popp (2004)
warns that some studies might be exaggerating the e¤ects of endogenous tech-
nological change by not taking properly into account crowding out of R&D in
other sectors. Nordhaus (2002) nds that factor substitution is more impor-
1See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), page 214.
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tant than technological progress, however, Nordhaus (2002) assumes complete
crowding out of R&D in other sectors.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: In Section 2 we introduce
the model without incorporating the learning externality, that is, imperfect
patent protection. In Section 3 we solve the model, and present the most
important results. Then in Section 4 we include imperfect patent protection.
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude, and suggest directions for further research.
2 The model
We look at a closed economy with constant business as usual emissions. Simi-
lar to Romer (1990) we have a research and development sector (R&D sector),
an abatement equipment sector corresponding to Romers intermediate goods
sector and an "emission sector" corresponding to the nal output sector. As
in Romer, the abatement equipment sector (intermediate goods sector) is
characterized by imperfect competition, and the R&D sector is characterized
by free entry of researchers. Further, in line with Romer, we assume that the
emission sector (nal good sector) rents the abatement equipment from the
abatement equipment rms (intermediate goods sector).2
2.1 The emission sector
Let business as usual emissions be given by "0. Emissions can be reduced by
renting CO2 abatement equipment. At each point in time there are a given
number of di¤erent abatement technologies available. We assume that each
type of abatement technology has a limited potential, and hence, that there
are decreasing returns to scale for each technology. Emissions "t is then given
by:
"t = "
0  
NtX
i=1
(uit)
; (1)
where uit is the amount of abatement equipment of type i rented at time t, and
Nt is the number of di¤erent technologies available at time t. The parameter
 < 1 ensures that there are decreasing returns to each type of CO2 abatement
equipment. However, this e¤ect can be circumvented by employing more CO2
abatement technologies instead of steadily increasing the use of one particular
type.3
2This may seem unrealistic as most polluting rms own their pollution abatement equip-
ment. On the other hand, in a perfect working capital market the per period rental price of
capital equipment will be equal to the per period cost of the capital equipment itself. Thus,
given that carbon abatement equipment can be bought and sold at any time, the renting
assumption should not inuence our result.
3One possible type of CO2 abatement technology is carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) for power production. The design of the CCS equipment will depend on the project
that is being considered i.e. steel production or electricity production, with respect to the
latter coal or natural gas, available storage technologies etc. Thus, the e¢ ciency of CO2
abatement is likely to increase with the number of di¤erent CCS technologies. See Goeschl
and Perino (2007) for a similar modelling of abatement costs.
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The emission sector minimizes the sum of emission tax payments and
carbon abatement cost:
min
uit
(
 t
"
"0  
NtX
i=1
(uit)

#
+
NtX
i=1
pitu
i
t
)
; (2)
where  t is the carbon tax rate at time t, and pit is the per period rental price
of CO2 abatement equipment of type i. Note that the second term in (2) is
the carbon tax payments, and that the third term in (2) is the rental cost of
CO2 abatement equipment, which of course increases in the amount of each
particular type of CO2 abatement equipment rented uit.
From the rst order condition for a cost minimum we obtain:
pit =  t(u
i
t)
 1; (3)
that is, the inverse demand function for each type of CO2 abatement equip-
ment as a function of the tax  t and the amount of each type of abatement
equipment uit. By rearranging we also have: u
i
t =

 t
pit
 1
1 
:that is, the
demand for each type of CO2 abatement equipment. Note that the higher
the number of available abatement technologies Nt, the lower is the cost of
reaching a specic emission target.
2.2 The CO2 abatement equipment sector
We assume that each equipment supplier produces only one specic kind of
CO2 abatement equipment. Further, each type of CO2 abatement equipment
is unique, and hence, each supplier faces a downward sloping demand curve for
its equipment. Thus, each equipment supplier maximizes prot with respect
to the amount of equipment to o¤er:
max
uit
it =  t(u
i
t)
 1uit   bituit;
where we have used (3) to insert for pit, and where b
i
t is the per period cost
of providing a standardized piece of CO2 abatement equipment of type i.
From the rst-order condition for prot maximum we obtain the supply of
abatement equipment at each point in time:
uit() =

 t
2
bit
 1
1 
: (4)
Further, by inserting, we obtain for the rental price: pit =
bit
 . Note that
each CO2 abatement supplier charges a mark-up over costs. In order to
simplify, we assume from now on that all kinds of equipment have the same
per period cost, and that this cost is constant over time and equal to b. This
implies that all available technologies will be used at each point in time.
6
Finally, we have for the instantaneous prot of the CO2 abatement sup-
pliers:
t = '
1
1 
t : (5)
Note that prots are increasing in the carbon tax rate. (For simplicity we
introduce ' = (1  )

2
b
 
1 
).
The optimal emission tax rate  t is a function of time where t 2 [0;1i.
From (5) we observe that the future income of each CO2 abatement supplier
will depend on the future path of  t. Hence, the discounted prot of a CO2
abatement rm at time t > 0 is equal to:
t = '
1Z
t
(s)
1
1  e r(s t)ds; (6)
where r denotes the market discount rate. We will from now on refer to t as
the value of a new idea.
2.3 The research and development sector
The CO2 abatement suppliers buy the right to supply one specic kind of
CO2 abatement equipment from the R&D sector. The licence is innite,
and we denote the licence fee by ft. Furthermore, in each period the R&D
sector o¤ers nt new technologies for CO2 abatement. This leads nt new CO2
abatement suppliers to enter the CO2 abatement market by acquiring the
right to supply one of the new technologies. Hence, the total number of CO2
abatement technologies (and CO2 abatement supplier rms) will accumulate
according to:
_Nt = nt; (7)
where _Nt denotes the time derivative of Nt.
There is free entry of researchers into the R&D sector. In particular, we
assume that in each period researchers make entry decisions simultaneously,
and that all researchers that enter the R&D market develops one idea. The
development cost per idea a is given by:
a(Nt; nt) =
1
a0
(Nt)
nt; (8)
where a0 is a positive parameter, and we have  1 <  < 1.
Note that within each period, the costs of developing an additional tech-
nology is increasing in the number of technologies that are made available
in the period. Or in other words; the more researchers that enter the R&D
sector in each period, the more e¤ort will be required from each researcher
for him or her to succeed in developing a unique, and thus, patentable idea.4
4A similar convexity assumption is made in Goulder and Mathai with respect to gener-
ating additional units of knowledge.
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Further, if  < 0, the cost is decreasing in the total number of technologies
that has been made available historically. In the literature, this case is often
coined "standing on shoulders of others", and can be interpreted as a sort of
dynamic "learning" externality. The opposite case in which  > 0, is coined
"shing out". In this case the costs of developing an additional technology is
increasing in the accumulated number of technologies, see for instance Popp
(2006) for a discussion of this issue. The development in Nt is external to
each researcher in the R&D sector.
In a Nash equilibrium with free-entry of researchers that develop one idea
each, the cost per idea must equal the everlasting licence fee i.e. a(Nt; nt) = ft.
Further, due to competitive bidding, the licence fee ft will be equal to the net
present value of prots from the technology t. At any time t > 0, we then
have:
t =
1
a0
(Nt)
(nt): (9)
We can then solve for nt and insert into (7):
_Nt = a0(Nt)
 t: (10)
Thus, the number of new ideas developed each period will depend on I)
The number of ideas developed previously Nt and II) the value of an idea t,
which again depends on the whole future emission tax path.
Note that the total cost of idea generation in each period is given by
1
a0
(Nt)
(nt)
2:Thus, the cost of the "last idea" is 2a0 (Nt)
(nt) = 2t, that is,
the costs of the "last idea" are higher than the value of the idea along the
equilibrium path. This is due to the free entry assumption, and can be looked
upon as a sort of crowding externality. When entering the research market,
each researcher does not take into account that their entry makes it more
costly for all other researcher to come up with a new idea. In the growth
literature it is thus also referred to as the "stepping on toes" e¤ect, see e.g.
Jones and Williams (2000).
2.4 Emissions and abatement costs
The object of the government is to set an emission tax path that ensures that
the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere stabilizes at some future time t
at a certain level. Let the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at time t
be denoted by t. The instantaneous emissions "t give rise to the following
change in the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere:
_ = "t   t: (11)
Note that a certain share  of the concentration  is broken down in the
atmosphere. hence, even for (t) = 0;8t, stabilization of the CO2 concentra-
tion at  = "
0
 will happen due to the constant decay rate. The concentration
function (11) is of course simplied, see for instance Farzin and Tahvonen
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(1996), but is commonly used in the economic literature, among others in
Goulder and Mathai (2000).
When setting the emission tax path, the government minimizes CO2
abatement costs at each point in time. The costs are of two types; R&D
costs and production costs for abatement equipment. Note that R&D costs
and production costs for abatement equipment together must be equal to the
discounted sum of total abatement outlay for the emission sector subtracted
the prots earned on the initial number of ideas. That is, the R&D costs for
the initial number of ideas N0 is already spent, and hence, for these ideas
only productions costs should be counted.
3 Solving the model
3.1 The dynamic maximization problem
In order to solve our maximization problem we dene t as a state variable.
For the development in t;8t > 0, we have the usual arbritage equation:
r = t + _; (12)
that is, the return you would get from selling the rm and obtain market rent
on the asset value must be equal to current prots and the change in value
of the rm. Hence, in line with neoclassical capital market theory, we assume
that the capital market is working perfect.
Note that (t) must be discontinuous at time t = 0. Regardless of its
initial value, its value will change at once the tax path is set.5 We obtain the
following optimal controle problem:
min
 t
1Z
0

Nt
b

ut  N0t

e rtdt; (13)
where the rst term inside the brackets is abatement outlay, and the second
term is the prots earned on the initial number of ideas.
The state variables develop according to:
_ = "0  Nt(ut)   t; (14)
_Nt = a0(Nt)
 t; (15)
_t = rt   t; (16)
and:
(0) = 0; N(0) = N0; (t)  , 8t  t: (17)
5This also implies that time inconsistency could be a problem, see Appendix B.
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There are three state variables: The concentration of CO2 in the at-
mosphere, the number of di¤erent abatement technologies, and the value of
a new abatement technology innovation. The current value Hamiltonian is
given:
H = Nt
b

ut  N0t + 1

"0  Nt(ut)   t
	
+2a0(Nt)
 t + 3 frt   tg ; (18)
The shadow price of carbon emissions 1 is clearly positive. That is,
given the concentration target, higher emissions in any period, or a higher
initial concentration, can only increase abatement costs. On the contrary, the
shadow price of new ideas 2 is negative. Since the more the emission sector
employs one particular idea, the less is the abatement e¤ect, more ideas can
only reduce costs (see also Appendix A).
The initial shadow price of the value of an idea 3 must be zero, since the
initial value of an idea 0 is essentially free i.e. the government can choose
any value at the outset as long as the emission target is reached. Then, due
to the "stepping on toes" e¤ect, we suspect 3 to be positive. That is, if the
value of an idea increases such that one more idea emerges, we suspect total
abatement cost to increase. The reason is that the cost of the last idea is
higher than the value of the idea (see Subsection 2.3).
Further, for t  t, we have the following Lagrangian:
Lt = Ht + t
 
   t

(19)
As already announced, we will compare two cases; with and without in-
duced technological change. The with induced technological change case is
identical to the case we have described so far. Furthermore, we will concen-
trate on the time period from t = 0 to t = t, that is, the time period from
now until the atmospheric concentration target is reached.
3.2 The optimal emission tax path
The expression for the maximum principle writes:
@H
@ t
=

 t   1
(1  ) t

Nt   3  N0 = 0: (20)
Clearly, we cannot have  t = 1 as long as 3 and/or N0 6= 0. Thus, the
standard result that the emission tax rate should be equal to shadow price on
emissions do not apply.
The rst costate equation is given:
_1 = (r + )1; (21)
From (21) we note the shadow price on emissions grow with the rate
r+ . Since carbon emissions are removed from the atmosphere by a natural
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process, and since this process is more e¤ective in absolute terms the higher
the concentration of carbon, the shadow price on emissions grow with a rate
that is higher than the interest rate.
It is hard to characterize all aspects of the emission tax path in the general
case, but the following propositions identify some of its properties. We start
by looking at the solution when  = 0 and N0 = 0. Note that when N0 = 0,
(20) will be true for all 0, since at t = 0, 3 = 0 as well. The following
proposition characterizes the path just after t = 0 (henceforth 0+):
Proposition 1 When there are no ideas initially, no dynamic learning exter-
nality in R&D and the patent protection system is perfect, we have  t =
1+
2 1.
That is, the emission tax rate is set higher than the shadow price on emissions,
and grows with the same rate as the shadow price on emissions.
Proof. See Appendix C
Note that the extent to which the emission tax rate exceeds the level
depends on , that is, the lower the , the higher is the di¤erence. The
economic intuition is that the lower the , the higher is the mark-up of each
abatement technology supplier and the higher is the deadweight loss from
monopoly pricing. Consequently, the emission tax rate should be set higher
in order to encourage more usage of each abatement technology.
Note also that the emission tax rate should grow with the same rate as the
shadow price on emissions. Since the mark-up in the abatement technology
sector is constant, the proportional relationship between the shadow price on
emissions and emission tax rate should also be constant.
The proposition implies that j2j = 11+t. That is, the shadow value of a
new idea is smaller than the value of a new idea along the equilibrium path.
This is due to the "stepping on toes" e¤ect mentioned above.
Next, let N0 > 0,  6= 0, and remember that when  < 0, we have the
"standing on shoulders" case, that is, making new ideas available becomes
less costly as the total number of ideas accumulates. Further, when  > 0 we
have the "shing out" case, that is, making new ideas available becomes more
costly as the number of ideas accumulate. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When there are some ideas initially and or there are ei-
ther positive or negative dynamic externalities in R&D, the emission tax rate
should not grow with the same rate as the shadow price on emissions.
Proof. See Appendix C and the numerical simulations.
If N0 > 0, our results indicate that it is optimal to set the tax rate
somewhat higher initially. The reason is that the initial ideas are free in
the sense that R&D cost are not needed before they can be applied. This
nding is clearly not in accordance with common intuition, which argues that
emission taxes should be high since there are few available technologies!
Further, the simulations presented below suggest that  < 0 implies a
less steep path, and that  > 0 implies a steeper path than when  = 0.
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That is, "standing on shoulders" yields an initial emission tax rate which is
relatively higher compared to the initial emission tax in the "shing out" case
(relatively in the sense; compared to later emission tax rates).
The question is now how endogenous technological change case (ITC case)
compares to the exogenous technological change case (ETC case).
4 Comparing the ITC and ETC cases
4.1 The optimal ETC emission tax path
In the ETC case the time path of Nt must be given, that is, for each instant
in time, the number of ideas that are made available are given exogenously.
The emission tax rate then only a¤ects the usage of each technology.
Since ideas are free in this version of the model, supply can start at once
an idea arrives without the CO2 abatement rms incurring any xed cost.
Further, in order to be able to compare the two versions of the model, we as-
sume that all ideas have constant marginal cost equal to b instead of b. Thus,
with price equal to marginal cost the usage of CO2 abatement equipment for
a given emission tax rate will be unaltered from the model with ITC described
above. The current value Hamiltonian in the ETC case is then given by:
H0 = Nt
b

ut + 
0
1

"0  Nt(ut)   t
	
+ 02 _Nt
where _Nt is exogenous (and identical to nt above). The superscript "0" on the
variables refers to the ETC case. For 0 < t  t, and after some rearranging,
the maximum principle yields:
@H0
@0t
=
0t   01
(1  ) t = 0; (22)
Clearly, we must have 0t = 
0
1. This is the standard result, among others
found in Nordhaus (1982) and in Goulder and Mathai (2000).
The costate equation with respect to the atmospheric concentration of
emissions is also the same as in Nordhaus and in Goulder and Mathai:
_
o
1 = (r + )
o
1: (23)
Thus, in the ETC case the emission tax rate should grow with the rate
r + . We can then compare the ITC and ETC cases:
4.2 Without knowledge externality or initial ideas
The development in the number of ideas is identical in the two cases. More-
over, when  = 0 and N0 = 0 we know from Proposition 1 that the emission
tax rate in the ITC case should grow with the same rate as in the ETC case.
Thus, the following solution is consistent with the maximum principle:  = 0
i.e. the tax rates are identical in the two cases. If the ITC tax rate had started
higher, it would always be higher, and since the development in the number
of ideas is identical in two cases, we would have had too much abatement.
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Likewise, if the ITC tax rate had started lower, we would have had too little
abatement.
4.3 With knowledge externality or initial ideas
For both cases it is hard to provide analytical results, and instead, we have
run numerical simulations on the model. The simulation model has 40 periods
of 5 years each. Concentration starts at 380 and is not allowed to exceed 500.
The model is calibrated such that in the base case i.e. when  = 0; N0 = 0,
the emission tax rate starts at just below $10, and peaks at about $100. With
these tax rates the target is reached in 70 years. After that the emission tax
falls due to a steady inow of more technologies, which makes it easier and
easier to keep emissions "t equal to the decay t (see equation (11)).
From the optimal ITC tax path, we obtain the endogenous development
in the variables nt and Nt. The same development is then implemented as an
exogenous development, and the model is solved over again for the optimal
taxation path in the ETC case. The results are presented in the following
gures, and we focus on the rst 70 years:
Figure 1 "The e¤ect of having initial ideas"
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In the "reference" scenario there are no spill-overs and no initial ideas.
In line with Proposition 1 the ITC and ETC emission tax paths are then
identical.
In the "with initial ideas" scenario approximately 25% of the ideas was
assumed to be available from the start. As seen from the two gures, future
emission tax rates can then be much lower since it becomes a lot less costly
to reach the target. Moreover, as seen from the gure at the right, the ITC
path is less steep than the ETC path. The reason is obvious: In the ETC
case all ideas cost b , while in the ITC case the initial ideas only cost b since
the R&D cost connected to the development of these ideas is sunk.
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Next we look at the e¤ect of knowledge spillovers. The size of the spillover
, is set such that in the "standing on shoulders" case total discounted costs
are half of the "reference" scenario, and in the "shing out" case they double
compared to the "reference" scenario. This amount to  being equal to 0:5.
In order to isolate the e¤ects we have set N0 = 0.
Figure 2 "The e¤ect of knowledge spillovers"
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In the "standing on shoulders" case the ITC emission tax path starts
higher than the ETC emission tax path, and after a while becomes lower
until year 70. Thus, the growth rate of the emission tax rate is lower than
the growth rate of the shadow price of emissions.
On the contrary, in the "shing out" case the ITC emission tax path starts
lower and becomes higher from year 50 on. Note also that the ITC path under
"shing out" are steeper than the ITC path under "standing on shoulders"
reecting that generating ideas is more costly in this case.
Observe also that the initial tax rates do not di¤er much compared to how
much they di¤er about the time the concentration ceiling is reached. The tax
rates in the period from 5 to 10 are 9.7, 13.1 and 9.4 in the "reference",
"standing on shoulders" and "shing out scenario", respectively. In period
65-70 they are however 99.6, 33.9 and 237.2, respectively.
The simulations have been repeated with parameter values of  in the
range [ 1; 1]. Moreover, we have run several sensitivity analyses varying
the curvature of the emission abatement function , the discount rate r, the
decay rate , and the cost parameter b and a0. All the time we get the same
distinction between the "standing on shoulders case" and the "shing out
case".
5 Imperfect patent protection
In reality patents are not innitely lived. When we in spite of this fact have
chosen to model patents as innitely lived, it is because we believe that rms
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holding patents often become technology leaders within their eld, and hence,
succeed in continuously updating their patents so as to keep some degree
of market power. However, rms do not always succeed in doing this, and
technologies may become generic. This is for instance implicitly assumed
when modelling technological change by industry wide learning curves.
A convenient way to introduce a learning externality in our model is to
assume that patents may be copied without cost at any point in time. Patents
that are copied will be supplied at marginal cost bit for ever after.
6 In par-
ticular, we assume that the probability of still holding a patent obtained at
t = t0, at time time t is equal to e (t t0). Hence, the value of an idea changes
to:
t = '
1Z
t
(s)
1
1  e (r+)(s t)ds; (24)
where (r+) is the new discount rate when future prot is conditioned on the
future state in which you still hold the patent. The new arbritage equation is
given by:
r = t + _   ; (25)
that is, the return you would get from selling the rm and obtain market rent
on the asset value must be equal to current prots and the change in value of
the rm subtracted the risk of loosing the whole rm.
LetMt denote the accumulated number of ideas at time t which no longer
is protected by a patent. The development inNt andMt can then be expressed
by:
_Nt = a0(Nt)
 t   Nt; (26)
_Mt = Nt: (27)
Thus, at any moment in time there will be two di¤erent markets for carbon
abatement equipment; one market in which price exceeds marginal cost and
one in which price equals marginal cost. We denote the supply of each type j
in the latter market by zj . Emissions is then given by: "t = "0 
PNt
i=1(u
i
t)
 PMt
j=1(z
j
t )
. At each instant in time the emission sector solves:
min
uit
8<: t
24"0   NtX
i=1
(uit)
  
MtX
j=1
(zjt )

35+ NtX
i=1
pitu
i
t +
MtX
j=1
bjtz
j
t
9=; ;  < 1; (28)
where bjt is the marginal cost of equipment of type j.
6See for instance Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Section 6.2, Erosion of monopoly
power", page 305.
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As before we assume that all types of equipment have the same marginal
cost, and that the cost is time invariant. We then have that pit =
b
8i; and
bjt = b8j. It is then easy to solve for zjt . The expression for discounted
stream of abatement costs also includes the number of ideas that no longer is
protected by patents, Mt, and we have one more state variable Mt. In order
to simplify we only look at the case in which N0 = 0. The object of the
government is then:
min
 t
1Z
0

Nt
b

ut +Mtbzt

e rtdt (29)
given (14) and (17) from Section 3.1 together with (25), (26) and (27)
from above. Note that zt > ut due to marginal cost pricing when ideas get
copied.
The analytical solution to the model in the case when patent protection is
imperfect is hard to interpret. Thus, we have instead ran numerical simula-
tions on the model. First, we found the optimal emission tax path with ITC
as before. Next, we assumed that Nt developed exogenously, and we found
the optimal emission tax path with ETC. The development in Mt follows au-
tomatically from (27) in both cases. In order to be able to compare the two
cases, we set marginal cost equal to b when the technology has a patent, and
b when not. Moreover, we set price equal to marginal cost. The usage of the
two categories of technologies is then identical in the two cases.
As above we present two simulations of the model. As mentioned the
simulation model has 40 periods of 5 years each, and the stabilization of the
concentration is reached 70 years into the future. We use a loss rate of 2.5%
each year. The results are presented in the following gure, and we focus on
the rst 70 years:
Figure 3 "Optimal tax paths with imperfect patent protection"
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We present the result with and without the "shing out" knowledge ex-
ternality. In the gure to the left there are only patent copying. Note that
the ITC emission tax path starts higher, becomes equal, and nally lower in
about year 50. The emission ceiling is reached in year 70.
When we introduce "shing out" this e¤ect is reduced, but it does not
vanish. Even though the "shing out" e¤ect is as strong as in the former
simulation ( = 0:5), the government should still start with a higher tax rate
in the ITC case than in the ETC case. The simulations have been repeated
with parameter values on  in the range [0:001; 0:5], the latter amounting to
50% loss rate each year. Moreover, we have run several sensitivity analyses
varying the knowledge spillover , the curvature of the emission abatement
function , the discount rate r, the decay rate , and the cost parameter b
and a0. As long as   0; patent copying implies a higher tax rate from the
start. In most cases, it is also so when  > 0, but not necessarily.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Unlike in Goulder and Mathai we nd that governments could have reasons to
set a higher carbon tax today if we have technological change driven by R&D
than if we have pure exogenous technological change. The result is dependent
of the direction and size of the knowledge externality and the extent to which
there is a learning externality. In particular, if we have either a "standing
on shoulders" type of knowledge externality or weak patent protection or
both, our ndings suggest that a high emission tax rate from the start may
be warranted. The robustness of this result has also been tested in several
simulations.
On the other hand, we consider a case without any form of R&D subsidies
or deployment subsidies for new technologies. Hence, our results are only
valid if such subsidies are not available. Clearly, future research should also
look more into the use of various forms of subsidies, like in van der Swaan et
al.(2002). The several externalities suggest using more instruments, and both
R&D subsidies and abatement deployment subsidies is easy to incorporate in
the model.
A high carbon tax today would lead to more usage of the few technologies
available today. Thus, our result has some resemblance with the ndings in
the learning by doing literature. Learning by doing implies that abatement
costs only declines as a response to actual use of abatement technology. On
the other hand, the learning by doing strand of literature seems to be assuming
that rms can not at all appropriate the technological improvements created
by their own learning.
If rms could appropriate parts of their own learning, rms might be
willing to supply carbon abatement to prices below marginal cost given that
future emission tax rates were going to be high. Thus, the need for a high
initial tax rate would likely be weakened (see Spence, 1981, for a general
analysis of the implications of learning).
Our results are in line with Gerlagh et al. (2008) and Hart (2008). Ger-
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lagh et al. (2008) model patents with a nite lifetime, and thus, investments
in R&D is below the social optimum. They then nd that the emission tax
rate should be set above the shadow price on emissions in a second best
world where only emission taxes and R&D subsidies are available to the pol-
icy maker. Hart (2008) also arrives at similar result, but unlike this paper
and Gerlagh et al. (2008), he also considers crowding out of investments in
production technology.
A caveat is that climate policies may be time inconsistent if decisions about
R&D and abatement are not taken by the government, but by independent
agents. To the extent that governments nd it hard to commit to a emission
tax path, this could pose a serious problem. Future contributions should
clearly look more into this topic.
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A The sign on the shadow prices
Given the concentration target, the optimal emission tax path (t)minimizes
the discounted sum of R&D costs and abatement costs. The optimal emission
tax path (t) corresponds to a certain emission level "t at each point in time
t. The optimal usage of each abatement technology at each point in time then
amounts to: ut = (
"0 "t
Nt
)
1
 , and the abatement cost of reaching the target
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"t at each point in time t equals: b("0   "t )
1
N
 ( 1 

)
t . Hence, at each point
in time the cost of reaching the target "t decreases in Nt. Note also that
emissions is a bad, that is, at each point in time the lower the target "t , the
higher the costs. We therefore conjecture that the shadow value of Nt must
be positive for all t. Moreover, that the shadow value of the concentration
must be negative for all t since a higher concentration will translate into a
lower emission level "t at least for one point in time.
B Time consistency
It is easy to check that the optimal controls are time consistent in the model
of Goulder and Mathai since the maximization problem is time invariant and
the two state variables follows smooth paths. However, with decentralized
decisions by private agents, as in our model set up, time consistency could
constitute a problem.
Let t be the optimal emission tax path, and let 

t , N

t and 

t be the
associated paths of the control variables. Suppose that the optimal plan has
been followed until time t = t^ > 0. Imagine a new decision maker who
minimizes the discounted sum of abatement costs from time t^ onward, that
is:
min
(t)
1Z
t^

Nt
b

ut  Nt^t

e rtdt;
subject to (14) to (16), but with the initial values of the state variables given
by (t^) and N(t^). The question is whether the new decision maker would
choose the original controle t from t^ and onwards?
The original problem faced by the decision maker at time t = 0 can be
transformed as follows:
min
(t)
1Z
0

Nt
b

ut  N0t

e rtdt = min
(t)
t^Z
0

Nt
b

ut  N0t

e rtdt
+min
(t)
e rt^
1Z
t^

Nt
b

ut  Nt^t

e r(t t^)dt;
where e rt^ is a constant.
If (t^), N(t^) and (t^) were common, note that
min(t)
1Z
t^
n
Nt
b
ut  Nt^t
o
e r(t t^)dt subject to (14) to (16) must yield the
same control as
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min(t) e
 rt^
1Z
t^
n
Nt
b
ut  Nt^t
o
e r(t t^)dt subject to (14) to (16). Thus,
we have time consistency as long as (t^), N(t^) and (t^) follow from history,
and cannot be chosen freely. On the other hand, in principle, (t^) is again
free. That is, if no additional constraints apply, the new decision makes can
choose any value for (t^) since it only depends on the future emission tax
path (which is the controle to be chosen).
C Proof of Propositions
In the following we will show that _ t = (r + )  t is consistent with the
maximum principle when  = 0 and N0 = 0, and not if  6= 0 and/or and
N0 6= 0 The rst order condition, the three costate equations, and two of the
three equations of motion are respectively given by:
1  1
 t
= (1  )(3 +N0)
Nt
; (30)
_1 = (r + )1; (31)
_2 = r2   [ t   1] (ut) + 2
_Nt
Nt
; (32)
_3 =  2a0(Nt) : (33)
_Nt = ta0(Nt)
 ; (34)
_t = rt   t; (35)
When _ t = (r + )  t, the fraction 1 t is constant. From (30), this implies
that (3+N0)Nt must be constant. By taking the time derivative of
(3+N0)
Nt
and
using (33) and (34) we then have:
 2 = (3 +N0)
Nt
t;
that is, the shadow price of a new idea is a constant fraction of the value of
a new idea. By (32) and (35) we nally have:
1
 t
  2
(1 + )

1 + 

Nt
3 +N0
=
t
put
nt
Nt
(36)
As long as  6= 0, this cannot be true. The left hand side of (36) is con-
stant, while both fractions on the right hand side will typically change in the
same direction. That is, ntNt will decrease as Nt picks up and
t
t
will decrease
as put picks up due to the increasing use of each abatement technology ut (t
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is the discounted sum of future t, and hence it will always increase slower,
if increasing at all).
Then, we consider the case when  = 0. The equation (36) can then be
reduced to: 1 t =
2
(1+) , and thus since  < 1,  t > 1. And further, we have:
3 +N0 =
1
1 + 
Nt
This cannot be true since when t = 0, 3 = 0 and we have: N0 = 11+N0!
We are thus left with case N0 =  = 0.
This implies: 3Nt =
1
1+ and  2 = 11+t:That is, the shadow value of a
new idea is smaller than the value of a new idea along the equilibrium path.
This is due to the crowding externality.
D About the numerical illustrations
We have obtained the numerical illustrations by using Excels "solver" tool.
The business as usual emissions "0 is set to 25, and the initial concentration
to 430. Furthermore, the model is programmed as a discrete time model in
which Nt accumulates according to: Nt = Nt 1 + nt. The total number of
periods is 40, and each period is 5 years. We assume that ideas developed
in one period are not ready for sale before in the next period. The model is
solved such that CO2 concentration target is not allowed to exceed 550 at any
time. Thus, in the basic set up we do not allow overshooting, however, when
we allow it, results are not changed. The simulations showed in the gures
used the following parameter values: N0 = 0 and 5,  = 0:15, b = 15; a0 = 15,
 =  0:5=0:5, r = 0:04 (the yearly discount rate),  = 0:025 (the yearly copy
rate in the case with learning externalities) and ' = 0:025. The di¤erent
model versions can of course be obtained from the authors upon request.
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